The first logic is called BLE (the Basic Logic of Evidence) and the second-that is a conservative extension of BLE-is named LETJ (the Logic of Evidence and Truth). (2017) and Rodrigues & Carnielli, (2016) present two logics motivated by the idea of capturing contradictions as conflicting evidence.

As a result, one can neither approach paraconsistency in general through evidence, nor approach evidence with the use of paraconsistent logics.

Also, when seen through the lights of the second kind of approach, a ‘logic as modeling’ approach, weaknesses of dealing with evidence through paraconsistency come to light, basically because evidence does not seem to suggest the need of a paraconsistent treatment. The first part of the program, we argue, does not succeed, on the grounds that it does not lead to a uniform proposal to the understanding of paraconsistency, and fails to engage with dialetheism in a legitimate dispute about interpretation of paraconsistency. In this paper, we first distinguish two conflicting programs entangled in the proposal: (1) interpreting paraconsistency in general through the notion of evidence, and (2) modeling reasoning with evidence by using paraconsistent logic. This approach is advanced as an alternative to dialetheism on what concerns interpreting paraconsistency and contradictions instead of having to accept that there are true contradictions (as dialetheists argue), it is suggested that we may understand such situations as involving only conflicting evidence, which restricts contradictions to a notion of evidence weaker than truth. In this paper, we analyze the epistemic approach to paraconsistency.

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